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The First Amendment and Fair Housing 
in the Platform Economy 
NANCY LEONG* 
The platform economy—a marketplace made up of businesses that 
profit by connecting providers of goods and services with users of those 
goods and services—challenges us to reevaluate our antidiscrimination 
laws. This Article considers one such challenge: how should public 
accommodation laws such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
the Fair Housing Act apply to the housing sector of the platform 
economy? Such laws, this Article explains, should apply in full to the 
housing sector. Moreover, legislators should act to remove the current 
statutory exemption for landlords who rent a small number of housing 
units and live on the premises from which they rent. While some might 
raise concerns that closing the exception will infringe upon these small-
scale landlords’ First Amendment right to free association, such 
concerns have no doctrinal basis. Moreover, closing the exception will 
in fact have the effect of advancing interests related to both freedom of 
speech and of association, particularly with respect to the people of 
color whom public accommodation laws were originally designed to 
protect. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Some hoped that the platform economy would usher in the end of race 
discrimination in the marketplace. Platform economy businesses profit by 
connecting providers of goods and services with users of those goods and 
services. Crucially, the connection takes place via an online platform, 
theoretically eliminating face-to-face interactions that trigger discrimination. 
The paradigmatic example is that of a black man attempting to get a ride 
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somewhere. In the old economy, he had to navigate the difficulty of flagging 
down a cab. But in the new platform economy, he merely has to push a few 
buttons, and moments later an Uber will arrive at his location. 
Unfortunately, however, research demonstrates that the platform economy 
has not succeeded in eliminating race discrimination. Platform design features, 
such as racially-identifiable profile pictures and names, often reveal race and 
lead to discrimination, while the rating systems used by most platform economy 
businesses can incorporate, perpetuate, and amplify both conscious and 
unconscious bias. 
This Article focuses on race discrimination in the housing sector of the 
platform economy, although the core insights are applicable to other areas as 
well.1 I have argued elsewhere that existing public accommodation laws such 
as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act should be 
interpreted to apply to the housing sector.2 Here, I extend that argument, 
explaining how the structure of platform economy businesses makes urgent the 
need to eliminate the so-called “Mrs. Murphy exception” from public 
accommodation laws. That exception currently makes federal bans on 
discrimination inapplicable to small-scale landlords.3 For example, Title II’s 
prohibition on discrimination in public accommodations does not include 
properties where a landlord actually lives and rents out five or fewer units, and 
the Fair Housing Act likewise exempts landlords who actually live on their 
properties and rent four or fewer units from its prohibition on discrimination on 
the basis of race.4 Yet the housing sector of the platform economy offers 
unprecedented access for many such small-scale landlords, with many rental 
properties advertised on major platform economy sites such as Airbnb, 
Homeaway, and VRBO consisting of a spare bedroom in someone’s home or a 
basement apartment in a townhouse. 
Would abolishing the Mrs. Murphy exception infringe upon the First 
Amendment right to freedom of association? As a doctrinal matter, I explain 
that it would not. Less obviously, I argue that eliminating the exception would, 
if anything, enhance the values that the First Amendment protects by 
encouraging a robust and open exchange of ideas and by protecting the 
associational interests of historically disadvantaged market participants. 
                                                                                                                     
 1 For example, available evidence suggests that ride-share businesses such as Uber and 
Lyft, service providers such as TaskRabbit, and financial facilitators such as Prosper all 
suffer from some of the same issues as the housing sector and would benefit from some of 
the same solutions. I have previously addressed some of these commonalities in other works. 
See Nancy Leong, New Economy, Old Biases, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2153, 2154 (2016); Nancy 
Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the 
Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1275 (2017). 
 2 See generally Leong & Belzer, supra note 1.  
 3 See Nathaniel Decker, Housing Discrimination and Craigslist, 14 CURRENT 43, 52 
(2010). 
 4 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1154 (Bernard 
Schwartz ed., 1970) [hereinafter 2 STATUTORY HISTORY]; Decker, supra note 3, at 52. 
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This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I briefly describe the history 
of public accommodation laws, recount the considerable evidence of race 
discrimination in the housing sector of the platform economy, and explain why 
existing public accommodation laws should be interpreted to prohibit many 
instances of such discrimination. In Part III, I focus on the exception in the 
existing public accommodation statutory regime for small-scale landlords. I 
explain why, given the structure of housing-sector platform economy 
businesses, existing laws should be reinterpreted or amended to eliminate these 
gaps. Finally, in Part IV, I examine the concern that such laws will infringe upon 
the First Amendment right to freedom of expression, concluding not only that 
such concerns are legally unsupported but also that removing the small-scale 
landlord exception will in fact enhance values associated with both the freedom 
of speech and of association. 
II. RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE PLATFORM ECONOMY 
Public accommodation laws arose as a response to Jim Crow. During the 
Jim Crow era—lasting roughly from the end of the Civil War until the early 
1960s—black people were subject to legal segregation throughout much of the 
South. As historian C. Vann Woodward puts it, Jim Crow laws “lent the sanction 
of law to a racial ostracism that extended to churches and schools, to housing 
and jobs, to eating and drinking[,] . . . to virtually all forms of public 
transportation, to sports and recreations, to hospitals, orphanages, prisons, and 
asylums, and ultimately to funeral homes, morgues, and cemeteries.”5 Travel 
was particularly difficult. As one researcher explained, “Discrimination was so 
real that not only did [black travelers] pack their own food; but also their own 
gas.”6 Black people had such difficulty finding room, board, and other services 
while traveling that guides such as the Negro Motorist Green Book were created, 
which relied on word of mouth from black travelers to create a listing of hotels, 
restaurants, and other establishments willing to serve black customers.7 
Such segregation, along with other civil rights abuses, ultimately prompted 
protests across the South and culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title 
II of that Act prohibits discrimination in “public accommodations”—places 
such as hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, sports arenas, and other venues held 
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2002). Woodward also emphasizes that this racial ostracism was not limited to the south. Id. 
at 18–19. See generally LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961) (analyzing the 
treatment of black people in the antebellum North). 
 6 Danielle Moodie-Mills, The ‘Green Book’ Was a Travel Guide Just for Black 
Motorists, NBC NEWS (July 11, 2017) (quoting Calvin Ramsey), http://www.nbcnews.com 
/news/nbcblk/green-book-was-travel-guide-just-black-motorists-n649081 
[https://perma.cc/YVU4-P8CH]. 
 7 THE NEGRO MOTORIST GREEN BOOK (Victor H. Green & Co. ed., 1936–1967), 
http://digitalcollections.nypl.org/collections/the-green-book#/?tab=about 
[https://perma.cc/JNH8-C82X] (available through the New York Public Library Digital 
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out as open to the public.8 The legislative intent behind Title II is clear. The law 
was meant to “eliminate discrimination in public accommodations affecting 
interstate commerce.”9 The Senate Commerce Committee stated that the 
fundamental objective of Title II was “to vindicate ‘the deprivation of personal 
dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments.’”10 People who suffered discrimination on the basis of their 
racial identity, the Committee understood, were denied full participation in an 
equal society. 
Four years later, the Fair Housing Act was passed as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.11 The Act prohibits racial discrimination in selling or 
renting a dwelling, thus extending public accommodation norms to a broader 
array of housing options.12 Similar to Title II, the Fair Housing Act was intended 
to spare nonwhite people the indignity of being denied housing as well as to 
serve integrationist goals by—at least in theory—making housing equally 
available to everyone.13 
Public accommodation laws such as Title II and the Fair Housing Act 
accomplished a great deal by changing norms about racial discrimination in 
housing. The problem did not disappear overnight, but in the decades since the 
passage of the two laws, overt racial discrimination diminished considerably.14 
Some hoped that the emergence of the platform economy would serve as 
the final nail in the coffin of race discrimination in housing. While there is no 
single authoritative definition of the platform economy,15 one well-known 
source describes it as a “socio-economic ecosystem built around . . . shared 
creation, production, distribution, trade and consumption of goods and 
services.”16 Others have characterized the platform economy as “[a]n economic 
                                                                                                                     
 8 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)–(b) (2012). 
 9 TO ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS AFFECTING 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 1 (1964), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 2355. 
 10 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 16).  
 11 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012) (commonly 
referred to as the Fair Housing Act). 
 12 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).  
 13 See Tx. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2515–16 (2015).   
 14 See id. at 2515–16 (acknowledging history of racial discrimination in housing and 
the shift from overt to disparate-impact discrimination). 
 15 See DARCY ALLEN & CHRIS BERG, INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, THE SHARING ECONOMY 
4 (2014), http://collaborativeeconomy.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Allen-D.-and 
-Berg-C.2014.The-Sharing-Economy.-Institute-of-Public-Affairs.-.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4T28-8B3B]; Rachel Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared 
Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.fastcompany.com/3022028/the-
sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition [https://perma.cc/UHJ7-AWNJ]. 
 16 Benita Matofska, What Is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO SHARE (Sept. 1, 
2016), http://www.thepeoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy/ 
 [https://perma.cc/E3H5-VQM3]. 
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system based on sharing underused assets or services, for free or for a fee, 
directly from individuals,”17 or as “[t]he peer-to-peer-based activity of 
obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, coordinated 
through community-based online services.”18 By removing the necessity of 
preexisting community relationships, the Internet dramatically amplifies the 
scale on which platform economy activity occurs.19 The platform economy has 
grown dramatically in recent years and is projected to continue to do so: one 
estimate predicts that the platform economy will grow from $15 billion annual 
global revenue in 2013 to $335 billion in 2025.20 
The concept of the platform economy is nothing new. People have been 
sharing unused or underused assets, often for monetary gain, since time 
immemorial.21 What is new, however, is the way the Internet facilitates 
economic activity online without the need for the face-to-face interaction that 
often triggers racial bias. It is this innovation that has given people hope for an 
end to race discrimination in the platform economy.  
Unfortunately, available evidence suggests that hopes that the platform 
economy would eliminate race discrimination in housing are misplaced.22 The 
problem is rooted in the design of platform economy businesses’ online 
platforms. As an example, consider Airbnb, which connects property owners 
with people looking for a short-term vacation or other rental; it offers an 
alternative to traditional hotels and bed-and-breakfast establishments.23 The 
                                                                                                                     
 17 Rachel Botsman, Defining the Sharing Economy: What Is Collaborative 
Consumption—And What Isn’t?, FAST COMPANY (May 27, 2015), https://www.fastcompany 
.com/3046119/defining-the-sharing-economy-what-is-collaborative-consumption-and-what-
isnt [https://perma.cc/MGU9-3ZD8]. 
 18 Juho Hamari et al., The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative 
Consumption, 10 J. ASS’N. FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 1002, at 1, 3, 4 (2015). 
 19 See PATRICK MARSHALL, SHARING ECONOMY (2015), https://businessresearcher. 
sagepub.com/sbr-1645-96738-2690068/20150803/the-sharing-economy 
[https://perma.cc/6VUF-68LM]. 
 20 Ashley Kindergan, Credit Suisse: By 2025, Companies Could Rake in $335 Billion 
a Year from People ‘Sharing,’ BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.businessinsider. 
com/credit-suisse-sharing-economy-revenue-335-billion-by-2025-2015-11 
[https://perma.cc/NR5Z-DXMY]. Indeed, according to the Federal Trade Commission, 
sharing-economy transactions totaled about $26 billion globally in 2013. Workshop 
Announcement, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, 
Participants, and Regulators (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public 
_events/636241/sharing_economy_workshop_announcmenet.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK68- 
NYEG]. Variation among estimates of the sharing economy’s value is likely a result of the 
lack of authoritative definition of the “sharing economy.”  
 21 The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. 
on Small Business, 113th Cong. 35–36 (2014) (statement of Philip Auerswald, Associate 
Professor, School of Public Policy, George Mason University), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CHRG-113hhrg86266/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg86266.pdf [https://perma.cc/T396-QUDX]. 
 22 See infra notes 35–43 and accompanying text. 
 23 About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/Z66N-
PNWK]. 
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company’s platform offers an opportunity to post attractive pictures of a 
property available for rent and detailed descriptions of its amenities. A 
transaction typically begins when an Airbnb user who wants to rent a home or 
an apartment logs in to the Airbnb app or website and finds a place to rent by 
searching through providers’ listings of their properties. The provider is notified 
of rental requests and, at his or her discretion, rents the unit to the user for a 
specified period of time.24 Airbnb then takes a percentage of the nightly rate in 
exchange for facilitating the transaction.25 
Airbnb’s platform includes a few key features shared by other housing share 
platforms.26 Such platforms require parties to have profiles, which typically 
include names, photos, and other biographical information.27 Sometimes the 
purpose of the profile is practical. According to Airbnb, the purpose of the 
profile is to build trust by giving parties more information about the person on 
the other side of the transaction.28 The company implies that the profile is 
something of a curriculum vitae for others in the Airbnb community. It explains: 
Airbnb is a community marketplace built on trust and safety, so “[w]e require 
all hosts to have a profile photo, and we require all guests to upload a profile 
photo before making their first reservation.”29 Like other platform economy 
businesses, Airbnb strongly encourages both providers and users to create 
detailed profiles to maximize the benefits from using the site.30 It says: “When 
your profile is robust, it helps others feel that you’re reliable, authentic, and 
committed to the spirit of Airbnb. Whether you’re a host or a guest, the more 
complete your profile is, the more reservations you’re likely to book, too.”31 
The flip side of the message, of course, is that providers and users who do not 
create such profiles will be at a substantial disadvantage. 
The emphasis on profiles in the platform economy is understandable. After 
all, if a platform economy provider is hosting a person he has never met in his 
home, it is natural to want to know something about that person so that the 
provider can establish that the person is trustworthy. But as currently 
implemented, such emphasis also raises concerns about bias and discriminatory 
behavior. As a means of providing information about parties to a transaction and 
establishing trust, platforms generally require or strongly encourage users to 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Host a Home, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes [https://perma.cc/ZWC6-
M85B].  
 25 Id. (noting the 3% service fee charged to hosts).  
 26 Other platform economy businesses’ platforms also share similar features, leading to 
similar conclusions, which I have examined in some detail elsewhere. Leong & Belzer, supra 
note 1, at 1287. 
 27 Id.  
 28 See Why Do I Need To Have an Airbnb Profile or Profile Photo?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/67/why-do-i-need-to-have-an-airbnb-profile-or-
profile-photo [https://perma.cc/2GR5-XVVN]. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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create profiles using photos and real names, both of which can and often do 
reveal racial identity.32 
With profile photos and real names as a basis, existing quantitative research 
provides support for the intuitive notion that the discrimination prevalent in the 
old economy also infects the new.33 In a recent study, researchers found that 
Airbnb properties listed by black people received 12% less than otherwise 
comparable properties owned by white people.34 Likewise, Airbnb users with 
“distinctively African-American” names had 16% more difficulty renting 
property.35 Moreover, qualitative evidence regarding instances of 
discrimination abounds. In 2016 the hashtag #AirbnbWhileBlack trended on 
Twitter, allowing users to share stories.36 Some incidents involved the use of 
racial slurs or statements like that a homeowner “did not rent to [your] kind.”37 
Many more stories followed a more subtle but equally troubling pattern: a black 
person attempted to book a room, was told that the room was unavailable, 
noticed that the room was still listed as available on the website’s calendar, tried 
again using a white profile, and was immediately offered the opportunity to 
book.38 Other users, particularly, although not exclusively, black, Latino, and 
Arab-American people, described relying on white friends or significant others 
to book rooms for them.39 Some of these incidents have resulted in civil rights 
lawsuits, some of which are currently pending.40 
                                                                                                                     
 32 See Leong & Belzer, supra note 1, at 1287. 
 33 See Nancy Leong, The Sharing Economy Has a Race Problem, SALON (Nov. 2, 
2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/11/02/the_sharing_economy_has_a_race_problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/X7AQ-K4TK]; cf. Benjamin Sachs, Uber: A Platform for Discrimination?, 
ON LABOR (Oct. 22, 2015), http://onlabor.org/2015/10/22/uber-a-platform-for-
discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/5V5A-369Q] (noting the potential for discrimination that 
arises when Uber riders rate Uber drivers). 
 34 Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of 
Airbnb.com 2, 4, 10 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377353 [https://perma.cc/HBN7-HTWH] (finding that nonblack 
hosts charge approximately 12% more than black hosts for equivalent rental properties). 
 35 Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment, AM. ECON. J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–2), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2701902 [https://perma.cc/NK4T-PNUC] (finding that it is 16% 
more difficult for black people to find a rental online through Airbnb than for white people). 
 36 Norrinda Brown Hayat, Trying To Appear “Not Too Black” on Airbnb Is Exhausting, 
CNN (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/12/opinions/too-black-rent-airbnb-
hayat/ [https://perma.cc/KW3X-LNZZ]. 
 37 Class Action Complaint at ¶ 25, Hobzek v. Homeaway.com, Inc., 1:16-cv-1058 
(W.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2016).  
 38 See, e.g., Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-cv-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 
(D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 39 See, e.g., Victoria Yore, As an Interracial Couple, We Know What Can Happen When 
You #AirbnbWhileBlack, HUFFPOST (May 9, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/victoria-yore/an-interracial-couple-airbnbwhileblack_b_9858468.html [https://perma.cc/D5HR-
SVWC]. 
 40 See, e.g., Selden, 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 (stayed on other grounds); Class Action 
Complaint, supra note 37, at ¶¶ 13–35. 
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Such evidence supports Jerry Kang’s observation, made more than a decade 
ago, that the Internet does not filter out racism.41 It also supports the need for 
legal mechanisms to address race discrimination in the platform economy in 
general, and the housing sector of that economy in particular. 
In other work, Aaron Belzer and I have argued that Title II and the Fair 
Housing Act should apply to platform economy housing sector businesses such 
as Airbnb, HomeAway, and VRBO.42 The explicit language of the statutes 
appears to encompass housing sector platform economy businesses in the model 
of Airbnb and its kind.43 More importantly, any analysis of housing sector 
platform economy businesses properly views such businesses as functionally 
equivalent to hotels: people seek them out for the same reason they seek out 
traditional hotels; they fulfill the same need as traditional hotels; they occupy 
the same market space as traditional hotels; and they compete with traditional 
hotels.44 We argue, then, that both Title II and the Fair Housing Act should apply 
to Airbnb and similar businesses the same way they would apply to traditional 
hotels.45 
Title II and the Fair Housing Act hold considerable promise for addressing 
race discrimination in the platform economy. Although it has not yet been tested 
in the courts, there is a strong argument that these legal mechanisms do, and 
should, apply to businesses such as Airbnb. Problematically, however, these 
statutes also have exceptions for small-scale landlords, who rent out only a few 
rooms on premises where they themselves live, which would exempt some 
landlords in a manner unique to the platform economy. In the next Part, I argue 
that these exceptions should be eliminated. 
III. CLOSING THE SMALL-SCALE LANDLORD EXCEPTION 
In order to pass Title II, proponents of the legislation had to compromise 
with their more hesitant colleagues by including the so-called “Mrs. Murphy 
exception”—a provision exempting landlords who lived on the premises and 
rented out five or fewer rooms.46 The phrase was coined by Senator George D. 
Aiken of Vermont, who suggested that Congress “integrate the Waldorf and 
other large hotels, but permit the ‘Mrs. Murphys,’ who run small rooming 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1153–54 (2000). 
 42 Leong & Belzer, supra note 1, at 1298, 1303. 
 43 See id. at 1298–99, 1302–04. 
 44 See id. 
 45 In our previous work, Aaron Belzer and I have also explained why some concerns 
that people have raised regarding litigation of sharing economy race discrimination—the 
Communications Decency Act, intent requirements, etc.—should not apply. See Leong & 
Belzer, supra note 1, at 1307, 1310. While these issues are largely beyond the scope of the 
present Article, readers may refer to my previous work for a detailed discussion. 
 46 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1154, 1742. 
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houses all over the country, to rent their rooms to those they choose.”47 As then-
Senator Hubert Humphrey explained: 
 
The so-called Mrs. Murphy provision results from a recognition of the fact 
that a number of people open their homes to transient guests, often not as a 
regular business, but as a supplement to their income. The relationships 
involved in such situations are clearly and unmistakably of a much closer and 
more personal nature than in the case of major commercial establishments.48 
 
The idea is that the relationship between the owner of a large hotel and its 
guests is a more impersonal and less intimate one than that of a landlord who 
rents to just a few guests, and that the distinction warrants an exemption from 
the provisions of Title II and, shortly thereafter, the Fair Housing Act. 
Whatever merit this position may have had in the 1960s—and my own view 
is that it was questionable even then—the structure of the platform economy 
renders it untenable today. Many individuals who offer accommodations for rent 
on Airbnb technically fall within the small-scale landlord exception on Airbnb: 
for example, someone who rents out their spare bedroom, a mother-in-law 
cottage, or a converted basement apartment would seem to qualify under the 
bare language of the statute. Indeed, even someone who lives in a large house 
and rents out several spaces within that house—some of which might be entirely 
self-contained and have separate entrances, such that the landlord and tenant 
virtually never interact—would nominally qualify for the exception. 
Yet it makes little sense to view these small-scale landlords as the functional 
equivalents of the archetypal Mrs. Murphy. By actively and voluntarily 
participating in the platform economy via Airbnb, the function of small-scale 
landlords is transformed in both degree and kind. 
Consider, first, the degree of Airbnb’s impact. The company has evolved 
into a major player in the short-term housing market. One estimate predicts that 
Airbnb will earn $1.6 billion in revenue in 2016 and $7.1 billion in annual 
revenue by 2020.49 Moreover, Airbnb is steadily cutting into the market share 
of traditional hotels: its global bookings are projected to reach $38 billion by 
2019; by comparison, Marriott’s 2015 bookings were $37 billion and Hilton’s 
were about $30 billion.50 The same report projects that Airbnb will cut U.S. 
hotels’ room-night growth to 1.2% per year over the next decade, as opposed to 
the 2% it would have been without Airbnb.51 And perhaps most startling, 
                                                                                                                     
 47 James D. Walsh, Note, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Call for Repeal of the Mrs. Murphy 
Exception to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 605, 605 n.3 (1999) 
(emphasis added). 
 48 2 STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1194. 
 49 Danny King, Report: Airbnb’s Revenue Will Close in on Hilton, Marriott, TRAVEL 
WKLY. (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.travelweekly.com/Travel-News/Hotel-News/Report-
Airbnb-revenue-will-close-Hilton-Marriott [https://perma.cc/V58T-MR8G]. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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Airbnb’s roster of accommodations now includes more than one million 
rooms—more than either Marriott or Hilton.52 The aggregation of hundreds of 
thousands of Mrs. Murphys into a streamlined online platform has a very 
different effect on society than scattered one-off small-scale landlords. 
Moreover, the small-scale landlords who enter the housing sector of the 
platform economy via Airbnb or another platform are engaged in a qualitatively 
different activity than the Mrs. Murphys of years past—that is, small-scale 
Airbnb landlords also differ in kind. An individual who makes a conscious 
decision to rent out part of her property on Airbnb is choosing to enter the 
market in a very different manner. Such a landlord wishes to avail herself of a 
sophisticated online platform, a substantial preexisting user base, a built-in 
online screening process for prospective tenants, and a wealth of information 
about competitive rates and standard amenities in the market she is entering. She 
wants, in effect, to use Airbnb, or a similar platform, to enable her to compete 
with the giants of the hotel industry. And, indeed, available evidence suggests 
that Airbnb provides the Mrs. Murphys of the world with the opportunity to do 
precisely that: a recent study analyzed 220,000 Airbnb listings, compared them 
to comparable listings on discount website Hotels.com, and found that in sixteen 
out of twenty-two cities analyzed, Airbnb accommodations were cheaper than 
hotels.53 
 The Mrs. Murphys of decades past offer a stark contrast to the small-scale 
landlord who chooses to take advantage of Airbnb’s streamlined platform and 
massive user base today. And in light of this contrast, the small-scale landlord 
exception is no longer warranted. By opting to participate in a platform economy 
business model, such as that of Airbnb, small-scale landlords are availing 
themselves of the ability to compete with hotels and should, therefore, abide by 
the same public accommodation laws as their competitors. And by aggregating 
the listings and preferences of hundreds of thousands of small-scale landlords, 
Airbnb creates a market force that is the functional equivalent of a hotel and 
should be governed by the same antidiscrimination provisions. 
Legislators should, therefore, work to close the small-scale landlord 
exception in Title II and the Fair Housing Act. As the next Part will describe, 
they may do so without fear of infringing upon the First Amendment rights of 
small-scale landlords.  
IV. SMALL-SCALE LANDLORDS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
This Part explains that there are no First Amendment barriers to closing the 
small-scale landlord exception, and that, moreover, closing the exception would 
further some First Amendment values. Part IV.A reviews the relevant doctrine 
                                                                                                                     
 52 See Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are Quiet, for 
Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/airbnb-grows-
to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for-now.html [https://perma.cc/UZY9-TERJ]. 
 53 Comparing Airbnb and Hotel Rates Around the Globe, BUSBUD, https://www.busbud. 
com/blog/airbnb-vs-hotel-rates/ [https://perma.cc/4H6J-VNPS]. 
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relating to free association, concluding that nothing precludes closing the small-
scale landlord exception. Part IV.B explains that eliminating the exception 
would promote more robust and honest communication; protect the 
associational interests of renters, particularly those who are members of 
historically marginalized groups; and further the government’s ability to 
communicate its own views. 
A. Free Association Doctrine 
Congress included the Mrs. Murphy exception in both Title II and the Fair 
Housing Act at least in part to protect the First Amendment right to freedom of 
association.54 The idea was that small-scale landlords—such as the 
paradigmatic widow who rents out a few rooms in her own home to earn a 
modest income—should not have to associate with those with whom they do not 
wish to interact. Yet even scratching the surface of this exception reveals 
unsavory reasons for it. Implicit in the idea that Mrs. Murphy should not have 
to associate with people against her wishes is the idea that Mrs. Murphy should 
not have to associate with racial groups against her wishes.55 The Mrs. Murphy 
exception is, thus, in tension at least at a conceptual level with the values 
expressed elsewhere in the Constitution—in, for example, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court held in Roberts v. United States Jaycees that the First 
Amendment freedom of association protects two different types of 
associations.56 The first, so-called “expressive associations,” are those that 
involve people coming together to communicate a message.57 In Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, for example, the Court held that requiring the Boy Scouts to 
include a gay Scoutmaster impermissibly infringed on the organization’s right 
to communicate certain ideas.58 Yet, the expressive association doctrine is not 
without limits: the Court’s later decision in Christian Legal Society Chapter of 
the University of California Hastings, College of the Law v. Martinez held that 
a religious student organization could be required to comply with a law school’s 
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral antidiscrimination policy as a condition of access 
to the school’s funds and facilities.59 In any event, the Court has made clear that 
                                                                                                                     
 54 Commentators have also widely recognized the purported First Amendment basis for 
the Mrs. Murphy exception. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The 
State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1379 & n.332 (2009); 
Walsh, supra note 47, at 607; Kevin M. Wilemon, Note, The Fair Housing Act, the 
Communications Decency Act, and the Right of Roommate Seekers To Discriminate Online, 
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 375, 378 (2009). 
 55 Emens, supra note 54, at 1379 & n.332. 
 56 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). 
 57 Id. at 618–19, 622.  
 58 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 655–56 (2000). 
 59 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 669 (2010). 
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to qualify for First Amendment protection, a group must actually engage in 
“expressive association”—that is, whether it engages in communicative activity 
that could be impaired by the inclusion of undesired members.60 It is difficult to 
envision how a standard platform economy host would be engaging in 
expressive activity by renting out her property. The typical host is renting out 
accommodations for the same reason as a Hilton or Marriott hotel: to make 
money. There is no expressive purpose to the transaction, and this prong of 
Jaycees simply does not apply. 
The other prong of Jaycees requires more discussion. There, the Court 
recognized a First Amendment right of intimate association, premised on the 
notion that certain intimate relationships deserve protection.61 Justice Brennan 
wrote for the majority in Jaycees: 
 
The Court has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to 
secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of 
certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of 
sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. . . . Protecting these 
relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the 
ability independently to define one’s identity that is central to any concept of 
liberty.62 
 
Jaycees articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors that determine whether a 
particular situation qualifies for the protection of intimate association: size, 
purpose, selectivity, and seclusion from others.63 The Court also suggested that 
relationships important to the “culture and traditions of the Nation” would more 
likely qualify.64 Both Jaycees and contemporaneous commentary suggest that 
the right of intimate association is not an absolute guarantee, but rather one that 
should receive varying degrees of protection depending on the circumstances of 
a particular case.65 Kenneth Karst, for example, explains: 
 
The freedom of intimate association, like other constitutional freedoms, is 
presumptive rather than absolute. In particular cases, it may give way to 
overriding governmental interests. . . . The freedom of intimate association is 
thus a principle that bears on constitutional interest balancing by helping to 
establish the weight to be assigned to one side of the balance.66 
 
Subsequent cases have been read to narrow the protection for intimate 
association afforded by the Jaycees decision. In FW/PBS v. City of Dallas, for 
                                                                                                                     
 60 See id. at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 61 Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 617–18. 
 62 Id. at 618–19. 
 63 Id. at 618–20. 
 64 Id. at 618–19. 
 65 Id. at 620. 
 66 Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 627 
(1980). 
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example, the Court held that an ordinance regulating hotels that rent out rooms 
for less than ten hours did not violate the associational rights of the patrons of 
those hotels.67 The Court concluded that the relationships in question were not 
within the realm of highly personal relationships, rooted in the history and 
culture of the nation, that intimate association doctrine protects.68 FW/PBS, 
therefore, limits the Jaycees holding to relationships traditionally accorded 
protection. 
In subsequent years, a multifaceted split has emerged in the circuit courts—
one unnecessary to articulate in detail for present purposes.69 Suffice it to say 
that no cases have held that a room rental qualifies as an intimate association, 
and that several cases have implied otherwise. For example, the Sixth Circuit 
declined to extend the protection of intimate association to an exclusive live-in 
sexual relationship when that relationship was adulterous.70 Likewise, in Chi 
Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City University of New York, the 
Second Circuit held that a fraternity that refused membership to women did not 
meet the criteria for an intimate association.71 In general, existing cases within 
this category have more frequently dealt with the situation in which people wish 
to form associations, rather than to exclude others from those associations.72 
This has been particularly true with respect to extending the intimate association 
doctrine to LGBT relationships.73 
For present purposes, however, the question is whether the relationship 
between a small-scale landlord and a person to whom she rents a room should 
qualify as an “intimate association.” No court has held that this is so. The closest 
any federal appellate court has come to suggesting that the First Amendment 
protects such an association is the Eleventh Circuit, in Seniors Civil Liberties 
Ass’n v. Kemp, which held that elderly plaintiffs who lived in a senior citizen 
complex could not restrain children from moving in next door to them given the 
Fair Housing Act’s 1988 Amendments, which prohibited discrimination on the 
                                                                                                                     
 67 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dall., 493 U.S. 215, 237 (1990). 
 68 Id. 
 69 Commentators have examined the circuit split in detail. See, e.g., Nancy Catherine 
Marcus, The Freedom of Intimate Association in the Twenty First Century, 16 GEO. MASON 
U. C.R.L.J. 269, 287 (2006); Collin O’Connor Udell, Intimate Association: Resurrecting a 
Hybrid Right, 7 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 231, 239–63 (1998). 
 70 See Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 71 Chi Iota Colony of Alpha Epsilon Pi Fraternity v. City Univ. of N.Y., 502 F.3d 136, 
147 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 72 See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1115 (11th Cir.) (same-sex marriage), 
reh’g denied, 120 F.3d 211, 214 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998); Doe 
v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 323 (3d Cir. 1989) (transitional shelter); Rigel C. Oliveri, 
Single-Family Zoning, Intimate Association, and the Right To Choose Household 
Companions, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1401, 1418–25 (2015) (tracing the Supreme Court’s 
associational rights jurisprudence). 
 73 See, e.g., Gwynne L. Skinner, Intimate Association and the First Amendment, 3 LAW 
& SEXUALITY 1, 2 (1993). 
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basis of family status.74 The Eleventh Circuit noted in dicta that “[i]f the Act 
were trying to force plaintiffs to take children into their home, this argument 
might have some merit”—but otherwise stated that “[o]f the five meritless 
arguments advanced by plaintiffs, their privacy and association argument is the 
most meritless.”75 In short, there is scant doctrinal support for the claim that the 
First Amendment entitles small-scale landlords to an exception to Title II and 
the Fair Housing Act. 
B. First Amendment Values 
First Amendment doctrine, then, does not appear to mandate the small -
scale landlord exception to Title II and the Fair Housing Act. While any 
number of compelling policy justifications warrant the elimination of the 
exception76—treating racial minorities rationally in the marketplace and 
ensuring that the law embodies norms of racial fairness and equality—I will 
focus here on the free speech values that, I will argue, militate in favor of 
eliminating the exception. 
As an initial matter, eliminating the small-scale landlord exception 
would be unlikely, as a practical matter, to force anyone to live with a person 
of a race (or gender, or religion) that they do not like. Title II and the Fair 
Housing Act require nondiscrimination on the basis of race and would 
require this of small-scale landlords as well if the existing exception were 
closed. Those statutes do not—and could not—require that a prospective 
landlord refrain from speech on the subject of race. So, for example, an 
individual who is adamantly opposed to renting a room to a black person 
might decorate the room with Ku Klux Klan paraphernalia that is clearly 
visible in the photos posted on Airbnb. Or, in her Airbnb profile, the host 
might list moderating threads on Stormfront.org as a favorite pastime.77 The 
point is simply that someone who does not want a black person living in his 
house has ample opportunities to communicate that desire. Such efforts 
would all but guarantee that a black person seeking lodging would look 
elsewhere as a result. So, a host cannot legally refuse to rent to black people, 
but nothing prevents the host from making himself so unattractive to black 
people that no black person would want to rent from him. 
With this reality in mind, closing the current small-scale landlord exception 
is unlikely to lead to the infringement on individual liberty that some critics 
predict. Moreover, closing the exception has a number of advantages relating to 
                                                                                                                     
 74 Seniors Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1036 (1992). 
 75 Id.  
 76 See Walsh, supra note 47, at 607 (stating that the existence of the exception shows 
that our nation still tolerates discrimination). 
 77 Stormfront.org bears the dubious distinction of being one of the Internet’s premier 
white supremacist websites. See Keith Schneider, Hate Groups Use Tools of the Electronic 
Trade, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/13/us/hate-groups-
use-tools-of-the-electronic-trade.html [https://perma.cc/2VS3-WNTG].  
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the values that the First Amendment is generally thought to protect. First, small-
scale landlords who cannot stomach the idea of renting to particular racial 
groups would have to communicate that sentiment explicitly in order to deter 
members of those groups from seeking to rent from them. Such communication 
would encourage small-scale landlords to examine their views and, overall, 
would foster a more honest social discourse. 
Second, closing the exception would allow markets to operate under 
conditions of better information. Given the priority assigned to the 
“marketplace of ideas,” surely First Amendment values are also served by 
encouraging fuller information within the housing sector of the platform 
economy.78 Under the current legal regime, small-scale landlords, such as 
Airbnb hosts offering up a spare bedroom or a mother-in-law cottage, need 
not declare or discuss their racial preferences. They can simply accept 
requests from people of all races and then quietly weed out members of racial 
groups that they dislike. Closing the small-scale landlord exception would 
require landlords either to rent to everyone on an equal basis or, to avoid 
renting to disfavored racial groups, to declare their racial biases explicitly.79 
The end result would be a better-functioning shared-housing market—one in 
which both users who are members of disfavored racial groups and people 
who do not wish to associate with racists could eschew landlords who 
discriminate.80 Individuals could adjust their behavior in the marketplace 
based on better information. 
Third, closing the Mrs. Murphy exception would better protect the free 
association interests of nonwhite people by providing them with better 
information about the people with whom they interact and form voluntary 
associations. A black person who wishes to rent a room on Airbnb might change 
her mind if she knew the host held virulent racist beliefs. Nonwhite renters 
probably would not waste their time sending requests to landlords who simply 
                                                                                                                     
 78 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (noting the “‘open 
marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (explaining the “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).  
 79 I acknowledge the tension between two First Amendment objectives: promoting full 
information in the marketplace of ideas and avoiding compelled speech and association. For 
present purposes, the point is simply that there are First Amendment interests on both sides 
of the equation. 
 80 One obvious if less desirable corollary is that people who affirmatively wish to 
associate with racist landlords could do so more easily. White supremacists, in other words, 
would have an easier time finding one another, a concern made more salient by the recent 
violent protests in Charlottesville and Airbnb’s decision to remove white supremacists from 
its platform. Jonah Engel Bromwich, Airbnb Cancels Accounts Linked to White Nationalist 
Rally in Charlottesville, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/08/09/us/airbnb-white-nationalists-supremacists.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P8TY-
J7CJ]. While I acknowledge this concern, I think it still is outweighed by the other First 
Amendment values I describe in this Part as well as the other policy considerations I 
mentioned briefly at the beginning of this Part. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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prefer not to rent to them—a task that consumes a great deal of time in the 
market as it currently exists. As one black Airbnb user put it, “I . . . know what 
it is like to spend too much of the work day trying to get an Airbnb host to accept 
you.”81 If discriminatory landlords were explicit about their views regarding 
race, people of color would not need to make such an investment of time and 
energy, to say nothing of the emotional investment of attempting to rent and 
being rejected over and over. The process of rejection is not unlike that 
documented in online dating. Indeed, OK Cupid’s finding that black women are 
rated as 16% less attractive than the mean82 eerily echoes the recent study 
authored by professors at the Harvard Business School finding that it is 16% 
more difficult for black people to find accommodations on Airbnb.83 Closing 
the small-landlord exception would minimize this wasted effort, and would 
instead allow people of color to focus on those with whom they prefer to speak 
and associate. 
Finally, the government’s own speech interests deserve consideration. 
While the First Amendment specifically protects against infringement of rights 
by the government, the courts have made clear that the government also has the 
right to distance itself from at least some speech with which it disagrees.84 
Moreover, in the broader realm of social policy, much has been written about 
the expressive function of the law. As James Walsh has said: “The existence of 
an exemption for owner-occupied dwellings announces that our nation still 
tolerates discrimination.”85 In a society that values free speech, it is valuable for 
the government to be able to disavow this view, and statutorily closing the small-
scale landlord exception would accomplish just that goal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Race discrimination is as much a part of the platform economy as the 
traditional economy, and the structure of the platform economy renders current 
laws inadequate to deal with certain categories of discrimination. I have argued 
that the small-scale landlord exception is particularly problematic in the 
platform economy and should be eliminated. Such a modification would not, as 
some have argued, abridge the First Amendment freedom of association, and 
would, in fact, better promote the robust and honest discourse contemplated by 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Hayat, supra note 36. 
 82 Christian Rudder, Race and Attraction, 2009–2014, OKCUPID (Sept. 9, 2014), 
https://theblog.okcupid.com/race-and-attraction-2009-2014-107dcbb4f060 
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average, and white men found black women 18% less attractive than the average). 
 83 Edelman et al., supra note 35 (manuscript at 1–2). 
 84 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (holding government restrictions 
on counseling for abortions to be constitutionally permissible). 
 85 Walsh, note 47, at 607. 
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the constitutional provisions that protect our freedoms of speech and 
association. 
  

